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Special Contribution

Open Chambers: Demystifying the
Inner Workings and Culture of the
Georgia Court of Appeals
by Stephen Louis A. Dillard
I vividly remember the day I learned of my appointment to the
Georgia Court of Appeals. I was sitting in my cluttered but comfortable
office, preparing for what would ultimately be my last hearing as a
lawyer, when the phone rang. On the other end of the line was
* Judge, Court of Appeals of Georgia. Samford University (B.A. 1992); 1Mississippi
College School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996). Member, State Bar of Georgia. I am
grateful to my friends and colleagues Justice Keith Blackwell and Judges Michael Boggs,
Lisa Branch, Sara Doyle, Christopher McFadden, Carla McMillian, and Billy Ray for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I also would like to thank my staff
attorneys, P. Robert Elzey, Tiffani Z. Moody, and Tiffany D. Gardner, as well as Michael
B. Terry and Grace Mann, for their invaluable feedback and helpful suggestions. I also
want to offer my sincere gratitude to Terry Jones, my administrative assistant, for her
encouragement and support throughout this process and for everything she does to make
my chambers run as smoothly as possible. Finally, I am eternally grateful for the patience
and loving support of my wife (Krista) and children (Jackson, Lindley, and Mary Margaret)
in this endeavor, as well as in everything I do in my capacity as a judge.
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Governor Sonny Perdue's executive assistant: "Mr. Dillard, do you have
time to speak with the governor?" I did, of course. And less than two
weeks after that brief but life-changing conversation with Governor
Perdue, I was one of Georgia's two newly appointed appellate judges
(and the seventy-third judge to serve on the court of appeals since
1906).'
Almost four years have passed now, and during that time a great deal
has changed at the court of appeals. Indeed, after spending less than
two months as the junior judge, five additional judges were either
elected or appointed to the court in just over two years.' In other
words, half of the court (six of twelve judges) turned over in a very short
period of time; this has undeniably impacted the nature and personality
of the court in a number of ways. But one constant remains: Much of
what we do as appellate judges on the court of appeals is shrouded in
mystery. I am not entirely certain why this is the case. It could be that
the culture of the court over the years has been for the judges to be
fairly tight-lipped about our internal operating procedures. It may also
have something to do with the fact that Georgia's appellate courts have
a practice of hiring permanent staff attorneys, and thus, unlike the
federal judiciary, we do not send a wave of law clerks out into the
workforce every year with "insider knowledge." But regardless of the
reasons for its enigmatic character, my hope is that this Article will
begin the process of demystifying some of the inner workings of
Georgia's intermediate appellate court.
This Article, then, is distinctly personal in nature. Suffice it to say,
my perspective of the internal operations of the court of appeals
discussed herein is just that, mine and mine alone. And while I am
certainly hopeful that the insights and observations I offer prove to be
of some use to the bench and bar, they should in no way be understood
as being universally accepted or endorsed by my distinguished colleagues. The reader should also understand that this Article is not
intended to be academic or comprehensive in nature. It is meant to give
practical advice to lawyers who regularly appear before the court of
appeals on unique aspects of the court's internal operations, or, at the

1. The other judge appointed that day was my friend and colleague, Justice Keith R.
Blackwell, who was later appointed by Governor Nathan Deal to the Georgia Supreme
Court on June 25, 2012. GEORGIA SUPREME COURT, http*//www.gasupreme.us/biograph
ies/blackwell.php (Last visited June 10, 2014).
2. Judge Christopher J. McFadden was elected to the court of appeals in November
2010 for a term beginning on January 1, 2011. Governor Nathan Deal then appointed
Judge Michael P. Boggs (Jan. 6, 2012), Judge William M. Ray (July 30, 2012), Judge
Elizabeth "Lisa" L. Branch (Sept. 4, 2012), and Judge Carla Wong McMillian (Jan. 24,
2013) to the court.
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very least, provide practitioners with a useful perspective on certain
practices from the viewpoint of a sitting appellate judge.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CASELOAD, THE TWO-TERM RULE,
AND "DISTRESS"

It has been said before, but it bears repeating- The Georgia Court of
Appeals is one of the (if not the) busiest intermediate appellate courts
in the United States,' and the court's considerable caseload4 is only
exacerbated by the two-term rule mandated by the Georgia Constitution,
which requires that "[tihe Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall
dispose of every case at the term for which it is entered on the court's
docket for hearing or at the next term."5 This constitutional rule
"imposes strict and (almost) immutable deadlines upon the merits
decisions of [Georgia's appellate courts),' and the Draconian remedy for
the failure to abide by this rule is "the affirmance of the lower court's
judgment by operation of law"' (something that has never occurred in
the history of Georgia's appellate courts). It should come as no surprise,
then, that many of the court's operations are reflected to some degree by
the intense pressure placed upon the judges and staff by an extremely
large caseload and the two-term rule. For example:
* Unlike many appellate courts, the court of appeals randomly and
immediately assigns each case docketed to a judge for purposes of
authoring the opinion.

3. See CHIusTOPHER J. MCFADDEN ET AL., GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE wrrIH FoRms
25-26 (2013-14) ("The record makes clear that both Georgia appellate courts regularly
remain in the top four state supreme and intermediate appellate courts in opinion load
. . . ."); MICHAEL B. TERRY, GEORGIA APPEALS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE WITH FORMS 11

(2014) ("The Court of Appeals of Georgia has been for years and remains the busiest
intermediate appellate court in the country, with more cases per judge than any other.");
J.D. SMITH, How TO WIN/LOSE YOUR CASE IN THE GEORGIA COURT OF APPEALS: KNOWING
How THE COURT DOES ITs WORK CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE 4 (11th Annual General
Practice & Trial Institute, Mar. 15-17, 2012) (noting that the court of appeals caseload, "by
many measures, is the largest of any appellate court in the country, and in terms of
published opinions per judge, it is unquestionably the largest").
4. In 2012, each of the court of appeals twelve judges handled 289 filings, the bulk of
which were direct appeals. See COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA, http/www.gaappeals.us
/stats/index.php (last visited June 10, 2014).
5. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 2.
6.

See TERRY, supra note 3, at 29.

7. In re Singh, 276 Ga. 288, 290 n.3, 576 S.E.2d 899, 901 n.3 (2003).
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* There is no formal conferencing between the judges,' regardless of
whether a case is scheduled for oral argument.
* Oral argument is entirely discretionary,' is only granted in about onethird of the cases in which it is actually requested by the parties, will
rarely be rescheduled due to personal or professional conflicts,' 0 and is
not permitted for "whole court" cases" or "applications or motions."12
* There are strict time limits for oral argument, strict page limits for
appellate briefs," and strict deadlines for filing motions for reconsideration, interlocutory applications and responses, and responses to
discretionary applications."

8. There is, however, a considerable amount of informal conferencing that goes on
between the judges. See ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, GEORGIA APPELLATE PRACTICE HANDBOOK
147 (7th ed. 2012) ("Unlike the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals does not hold regular
decisional bancs. Informal bancs do occur, however.").
9. See CT. APPEALS R. 28(aX1) ("Unless expressly ordered by the Court, oral argument
is never mandatory and argument may be submitted by briefs only.").
10. See CT. APPEALS R. 28(c) ("Postponements of oral argument are not favored, and
no postponement shall be granted under any circumstances that would allow oral argument
to take place during a term of the Court subsequent to the term for which the case was
docketed.").
11. See O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c)(3) (2012) (noting that oral argument shall not be held in
seven-judge or twelve-judge cases).
12. CT. APPEALS R. 28(a)(1); see also CT. APPEALS R. 37(h) (disallowing oral argument
on motions for reconsideration); CT. APPEALS R. 44(c) (disallowing oral argument on
motions to recuse).
13. See CT. APPEALS R. 24(f) ("Briefs and responsive briefs shall be limited to 30 pages
in civil cases and 50 pages in criminal cases including exhibits and appendices, except upon
written motion directed to the Clerk and approved by the Court. Appellant's reply brief
shall be limited to 15 pages.").
14. See CT. APPEALS R. 4(e) ("Any other provision of these rules notwithstanding, a
motion for reconsideration shall be deemed filed only on the date on which it is physically
received in the office of the Clerk. See Rule 37."); CT. APPEALS R. 16 (c) ("No extension of
time shall be granted to file an interlocutory application or a response thereto. An
extension of time may be granted pursuant to [CT. APPEALS R. 31(g)] to file a discretionary
application, but no extension of time may be granted for filing a response to such
application."); CT. APPEALS R. 32(a) ("An application for interlocutory appeal shall be filed
in this Court within 10 days of the entry of the trial court's order granting the certificate
for immediate review."); CT. APPEALS R. 32(b) ("An application for discretionary appeal
shall be filed in this Court generally within 30 days of the date of the entry of the trial
court's order being appealed."); CT. APPEALS R. 37(b) ("Motions for reconsideration shall be
filed within 10 days from the rendition of the judgment or dismissal .... No extension of
time shall be granted except for providential cause on written motion made before the
expiration of 10 days. No response to a motion for reconsideration is required, but any
party wishing to respond must do so expeditiously."); CT. APPEALS R. 37(d) ("No party shall
file a second motion for reconsideration unless permitted by order of the Court. The filing
of a motion for permission to file a second motion for reconsideration does not toll the 10
days for filing a notice of intent to apply for certiorari with the Supreme Court of
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* The court frequently remands a case when there has been a significant
delay in transmitting the transcript or some other part of the appellate
record."
* The court is often unable to hold or delay consideration of a case
involving an issue under consideration by the Georgia Supreme Court or
the United States Supreme Court.
* The court is often unable to give multiple extensions of time to file an
appellate brief.
* The court is often unable to hold a case when there are ongoing
mediation or settlement efforts. 6
* Cases that are ultimately considered by a seven-judge or twelve-judge
"whole court" (discussed infra) are not re-briefed or re-argued, and the
parties are not informed that their case has moved beyond the consideration of the initial three-judge panel until the court's opinion is
published.
* During the final month of a term (which, as explained infra, the court
refers to internally as "Distress")," the judges are extremely focused on
circulating their colleagues' cases and are often unable to spend as much
time as they would like reviewing those cases (while still spending as
much time as is needed to thoughtfully consider the merits of each case).
* In the rare cases in which the judgment line "flips" after a motion for
reconsideration has been filed and granted, the losing party may be

Georgia.").
15. See CT. APPEALs R. 11(d) ("Any case docketed prior to the entire record coming to
the Court, as requested by the parties, may be remanded to the trial court until such time
as the record is so prepared and delivered to the Court."); of Rodriguez v. State, 321 Ga.
App. 619, 627, 746 S.E.2d 366, 372 (2013) (Dillard, J., dissenting) (noting that "our
constitutional duty to resolve this appeal today-and thus within two terms of docketing-places time constraints upon the reconsideration of this case that also warrant
vacating and remanding to the trial court").
16. See TERRY, supra note 3, at 32-33 ("Another example of the courts 'working around'
the Two Term Rule involves settlements reached during the appeal of cases of types
requiring trial court approval of any settlement. This would include, for example, cases
where one party is a minor, cases involving estates, and class actions. If a settlement
requiring trial court approval is reached while the case is pending in the appellate court,
the court generally will not stay the appeal to await trial court approval . ... The
appellate court may, however, dismiss the appeal with leave to re-appeal if the trial court
fails to approve the settlement.").
17. See ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, supra note 8, at 148 ("In the vernacular of the appellate
courts, 'distress' cases are those cases that have reached the second term without being
decided, and 'distress day' is the last day on which opinions can be issued for distress
cases.").
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effectively deprived of the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration
from this revised decision."
The internal pressures placed upon the court of appeals by the twoterm rule culminate three times a year with the constitutional deadlines
for the January, April, and September terms. Indeed, while the court
remains busy year-round, things get especially hectic the month before
these deadlines-a time period we refer to as "Distress." Any opinion
that circulates during this period is embossed with the attention-getting
"DISTRESS" stamp in b'right red ink, and is addressed immediately by
the judges charged with considering the merits of that case. As my
colleague, Judge John J. Ellington, is fond of saying, "Distress brings
with it great clarity"; and this is absolutely true. Our Distress period
seems to fly by, and there is simply no delaying the inevitable. The
judges have to make a decision in each Distress case by the deadline,
whether we like it or not. And in most cases, the two-term rule works
perfectly and (no doubt) as intended. But in a handful of cases each
term, I am reminded (sometimes in rather stark terms) that the
tremendous efficiency brought about by the two-term rule' 9 can come
at a steep price in especially complex cases that-notwithstanding every
effort to resolve those cases at an earlier time-are decided during the
waning days of Distress. Thus, while I am a strong supporter of the
two-term rule, I also firmly believe that litigants are not well served
when judges do not have the time they need to thoughtfully reflect upon
the merits of an appeal decided during Distress. My hope is that a
constitutionally permissible means of addressing this problem will be
identified and implemented in the near future.
What lawyers should take away from the foregoing discussion, then,
is that the court of appeals continually operates under enormous
internal pressures, and that it is absolutely crucial for practitioners
appearing before the court to expend a considerable amount of time and
effort preparing their appellate briefs and oral-argument presentations
with these pressures in mind.

18. See Rodriguez, 321 Ga. App. at 627 n.20, 746 S.E.2d at 372 n.20 (Dillard, J.,
dissenting) ("In referencing the time constraints placed upon the Court in this case, I am
not only referring to the limited amount of time that many members of the Court had to
consider the complex issues presented by this appeal, but also to the fact that our decision
to adopt this new, substituted opinion precludes Rodriguez from filing a motion for
reconsideration.").
19. See TERRY, supra note 3, at 35 ("On the positive side, the Two Term Rule keeps the
courts from falling behind. It imposes discipline and efficiency. It keeps the litigation
process moving. It introduces an element of predictability into the timing of judicial
decisions that is lacking in other jurisdictions.").
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BRIEFING TIPS

A great deal of ink has been spilled in recent years offering lawyers
advice on crafting the perfect appellate brief, and I will refrain from
rehashing these important but all-too-familiar pointers in this essay.20
Instead, I will offer just a few suggestions to lawyers who regularly
submit briefs to the court of appeals.
First, consider giving the court a roadmap of your argument at the
outset of the brief. Specifically, I strongly recommend including a
"Summary of Argument" section, even though our rules do not currently
require it.21 I am constantly amazed at how many times I read briefs
that only get to the heart of the argument after spending ten to fifteen
pages recounting largely unimportant background information and
procedural history. Get to the point quickly. You do not want our judges
and staff attorneys reading and re-reading your brief in an attempt to
figure out the basis of your client's appeal, especially given the severe
time constraints placed upon the court by its heavy docket and the
aforementioned two-term rule.
Second, and I cannot emphasize this enough, be generous and
absolutely precise with your record and legal citations. The quickest
way to sabotage your appeal is to fail to substantiate legal arguments or
key factual or procedural assertions. Court of Appeals Rule 25(a)"
requires that appellant's brief, among other things, "contain a succinct
and accurate statement of . .. the material facts relevant to the appeal
and the citation of such parts of the record or transcript essential to a
consideration of the errors complained of," as well as the "argument and
citation of authorities," and that "[riecord and transcript citations shall
be to the volume or part of the record or transcript and the page
numbers that appear on the appellate record or transcript as sent from
the trial court."" And when an appellant fails to support an enumeration of error in its brief by (1) citation of authority or argument, or (2)

20. While there are many excellent books and essays on the art of brief writing, I
highly recommend ANTONIN ScALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART
OF PERSUADING JUDGES (2008).

21. Id. at 97 (noting that many judges "consider the Summary of Argument
indispensible-indeed, the most important part of the brief).
22. CT. APPEALS R. 25(a).
23. Id.; see also CT. APPEALS R. 25(b)(1) (requiring the appellee to "point out any
material inaccuracy or incompleteness of appellant's statement of facts and any additional
statement of facts deemed necessary, plus such additional parts of the record or transcript
deemed material," and noting that "[flailure to do so shall constitute consent to a decision
based on the appellant's statement of facts," and that "[e]xcept as controverted, appellant's
statement of facts may be accepted by this Court as true").
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specific reference to the record or transcript, "the Court will not search
for or consider such enumeration," which "may be deemed abandoned."'
Finally, lawyers who regularly practice before Georgia's appellate
court need to understand the significant impact that the court of appeals
"physical precedent" rule has on our state's body of jurisprudence, 25 and
briefs to our court should specifically identify these precedents when
they are used to support an argument.
A physical precedent of the court of appeals is neither binding on the
state's trial courts nor on the court of appeals itself, but the opinion is
instead merely persuasive authority.26 Typically, a published opinion
becomes a "physical precedent" when an opinion of a three-judge
panel" includes a "concurrence in the judgment only,"28 which is
referred to internally as a "JO,"or "a special concurrence without a
statement of agreement with all that is said [in the majority opinion]"29 As to the former, it is not always readily apparent that a
published opinion includes a concurrence in judgment only by one of the
three panel members. This is because the majority of concurrences in
judgment only are done without an opinion, so the only way an attorney

24. CT. APPEALS R. 25(c)(2); see also Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93, 95, 726 S.E.2d
596, 598 (2012) (noting that even pro se litigants are required to comply with Court of
Appeals Rule 25(cX2)); Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 895, 897 n.8, 723 S.E.2d 100, 105
n.8 (2012) (noting that the court of appeals will not cull the record on a party's behalf);
Nelson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 307 Ga. App. 220, 226 n.22, 704 S.E.2d 868,
874 n.22 (2010) (noting that because "plaintiffs' arguments do not address the substantive
merits of the trial court's decision ... those claims are deemed to be abandoned").
25. See Eugene Volokh, Supermajority Rules for Court Opinions, and "Physical
Precedent, VOLoKH CONSPIRACY (July 13, 2011, 2:53 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/07
/13/supermajority-rules-for-court-opinions-and-physical-precedent/ ("Georgia seems to be
one of the few American jurisdictions that requires a supermajority on a court to reach a
binding decision-if the three-judge panel splits 2-1, the case must either be reheard by a
larger court (if the one judge is in the dissent) or at least will lack full precedential value
(if the one judge concurs only in the judgment).").
26. Chaparral Boats, Inc. v. Heath, 269 Ga. App. 339, 349-50, 606 S.E.2d 567, 575
(2004) (Barnes, J., concurring specially) (noting that a physical precedent "may be cited as
persuasive authority, just as foreign case law or learned treatises may be persuasive, but
it is not binding law for any other case").
27. See O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(b) (2012) ("The court shall sit in divisions composed of three
Judges in each division.").
28. See Ga. Farm Bureaus Mut. Ins. Co. v. Franks, 320 Ga. App. 131, 137 n.14, 739
S.E.2d 427, 433 n.14 (2013) ("When a panel judge concurs in the judgment only, a case
serves as physical precedent only, which is not binding in subsequent cases.").
29. CT. APPEALS R. 33(a); see also Whitfield v. Tequila Mexican Rest. No. 1, Inc., 323
Ga. App. 801, 803 n.2, 748 S.E.2d 281, 285 n.2 (2013) (noting that "[ulnder Court of
Appeals Rule 33(a), a special concurrence that does not agree with all that is said renders
the opinion to be physical precedent only").
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can identify an opinion as being or including a physical precedent is to
read the judgment line (which is easy to overlook).30 This is why I
often write an actual opinion, highlighting my concurrence in judgment
only, to make it absolutely clear to the bench and bar that the majority
opinion is or includes 3' a physical precedent and is not binding
authority.3 2 And, as noted supra, the only way to tell if a special
concurrence triggers the court's physical-precedent rule is to carefully
read that concurrence and make sure that it can be reasonably
understood as containing a statement of agreement with all that is said
in the majority opinion. If no such statement is included, then the
opinion (or any identified division of that opinion) is not binding in
future cases.3 3
That said, I do not believe that a lawyer should shy away from citing
a physical-precedent opinion to our court or the Georgia Supreme Court
(especially if you believe that the reasoning contained in that opinion is
persuasive), so long as you clearly designate the opinion as being or
Indeed, at least some of my colcontaining a physical precedent.'

30. See, e.g., Jones v. Morris, 325 Ga. App. 65, 70, 752 S.E.2d 99, 103 (2013); Nixon v.
Pierce Cnty. Sch. Dist., 322 Ga. App. 745, 751, 746 S.E.2d 225, 229 (2013).
31. It is important to keep in mind that many of the opinions published by the court
of appeals have separate divisions and that our judges can and often do concur in judgment
only as to a specific division (rather than the entire opinion). See, e.g., Monitronics Int'l,
Inc. v. Veasley, 323 Ga. App. 126, 142, 746 S.E.2d 793,807 (2013) (Boggs & McMillian, JJ.,
concurring in judgment only as to Division 2 of the majority opinion).
32. See, e.g., Felton v. State, 322 Ga. App. 630, 635-36, 745 S.E.2d 832, 837 (2013)
(Dullard, J., concurring in judgment only); Mauldin v. Mauldin, 322 Ga. App. 507, 518, 745
S.E.2d 754, 763 (2013) (Dillard, J., concurring in judgment only).
33. In opinions published by a seven-judge or twelve-judge "whole court," there must
be a majority of the judges fully concurring in the opinion or any particular division of that
opinion for it to be binding precedent in future cases (four judges and seven judges,
respectively). See ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, supra note 8, at 148 ("[Wlhen fewer than a
majority of the judges sitting as a seven-judge or [twelve]-judge court concur with all that
is said in the decision, the decision constitutes a nonbinding 'physical' precedent only.").
34. See, e.g., Whitfield, 323 Ga. App. at 803 n.2, 748 S.E.2d at 284 n.2 (adopting the
reasoning of a physical precedent because "we find the majority's discussion of an owner
or occupier of land's potential liability for criminal acts of third parties to be highly
persuasive, particularly in light of the similar fact pattern in this case"), Muldrow v. State,
322 Ga. App. 190, 195 n.29, 744 S.E.2d 413, 418 n.29 (2013) ("This is not to say, however,
that a party on appeal should shy away from citing physical precedent as persuasive
authority.... Nevertheless, it is crucial that litigants explicitly designate physical
precedent as such, and thoroughly explain why this Court should adopt the reasoning from
that particular opinion."). Even the Georgia Supreme Court has recognized and relied
upon the physical precedents of our court from time to time. See, e.g., Couch v. Red Roof
Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 365, 729 S.E.2d 378, 383 (2012) (noting that "there is already
persuasive Georgia precedent on this issue," citing a physical precedent of the court of
appeals).
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leagues (and yours truly) believe that the physical precedents of our
court are entitled to a greater degree of consideration and respect than
opinions from other jurisdictions. 5 And once a physical precedent has
been adopted by a unanimous three-judge panel of our court, by a
majority of the judges in a seven-judge or twelve-judge "whole court"
decision, or by the supreme court, that precedent then becomes binding
authority in future cases.36
The foregoing briefing suggestions, of course, only begin to scratch the
surface of what is necessary to craft a persuasive, "winning" brief with
the court of appeals; but they are, in my view, the most overlooked or
least known tips. To put it plainly, a lawyer's likelihood of success on
appeal before our court is largely dependent upon the substance of the
appellate brief(s). As my former colleague, Judge J.D. Smith, has rightly
and astutely observed, "[tihe Court's procedures and its institutional
culture mean that the brief is almost always far, far more important,
[and] far more likely to be outcome-determinative than oral argument."07
III.

ORAL ARGUMENT

Nevertheless, oral argument is of great significance to those lawyers
who appear before the court of appeals and plead their client's case.
Indeed, as anyone who regularly practices before our court is well aware,
the vast majority of oral-argument requests are denied." Naturally,
practitioners assume that this is due to the court's heavy docket. And
while this assumption is perhaps accurate as to a minority of the
requests, the bulk of motions for oral argument that I deny are rejected

35. Muldrow, 322 Ga. App. at 195 n.29, 744 S.E.2d at 418 n.29 (noting that "some of
the judges on this Court are of the view that our physical-precedent cases should be
afforded greater consideration than decisions from appellate courts in other jurisdictions").
36. Johnson v. Butler, 323 Ga. App. 743, 746 n.13, 748 S.E.2d 111, 113 n.13 (2013)
("Assuming arguendo that [Tanner v. Golden, 189 Ga. App. 894, 377 S.E.2d 875 (1989)] is
only physical precedent, it is ultimately of no consequence because a subsequent,
unanimous panel of this Court fully adopted the reasoning of Tanner in (Troup Cnty. Bd.
of Educ. v. Daniel, 191 Ga. App. 370, 381 S.E.2d 586 (1989)] the opinion noted supra. The
District's contention that Court of Appeals Rule 33(a) precludes a panel of this Court from
fully adopting, and thus making fully precedential, a prior physical precedent is wholly
without merit.").
37. SmrrH, supra note 3, at 8.
38. TERRY, supra note 3, at 197 ("The Court of Appeals grants oral argument in only
about one third of the cases where a request is received.").
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because they are either untimely" or fail to even remotely comply with
Court of Appeals Rule 28(aX4), 4o which provides that
[a] request shall contain a brief statement describing specifically how
the decisional process will be significantlyaided by oral argument. The
request should be self-contained and should convey the specific reason
or reasons oral argument would be beneficial to the Court. Counsel
should not assume the brief or the record shall be considered in ruling
on the request for oral argument.'
Most of the requests we receive, however, entirely disregard the
requirements of this rule, averring nothing more than the desire to have
oral argument or some generalized assertion that the case is "complex"
and that the court will "benefit" from discussing this nondescript
complexity with the designated attorneys.4 2 These generic requests are
ultimately denied for failing to comply with the rule, rather than being
denied on the merits.
In contrast, a persuasive request for oral argument draws the judge
into the case after the first few sentences. A good appellate practitioner
treats a request for oral argument as an opportunity to pique the court's
interest in his client's story and the issues presented by that case. And
while this list is far from exclusive, here are some categories of appeals
that, in my view, have a strong likelihood of being granted oral
argument:
* A case involving an issue of first impression;
* A case involving conflicting lines of jurisprudence;
* A case presenting an issue with statewide implications;
* A case involving the application of settled legal principles to a novel
set of facts;
* A case involving an area of law with very little precedent;
* A case involving an area of law in serious need of clarification.

39. See CT. APPEALS R. 28(a)(2) ("A request for oral argument shall be filed within
[twenty] days from the date the case is docketed in this Court. An extension of time to file
brief and enumeration of errors does not extend the time to request oral argument.").
40. CT. APPEALS R. 28(a)(4).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, supra note 8, at 118 ("(Clounsel should explain what
distinguishes this case from the normal one in which oral argument is not helpful.
Statements that oral argument is warranted 'because the case is an important one' or that
oral argument 'is necessary to clarify the issues' are not adequate.").
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But the reality is that there is no magic formula for getting your oral
argument request granted.4 ' All you can do is present your selfcontained request" in the most compelling manner possible and hope
for the best. The good news is that it only takes one judge to grant oral
argument, so you have three opportunities to convince the court that
your appeal satisfies the dictates of Rule 28(a)(4).4 '
Once oral argument is granted, the case is then placed on the oralargument calendar (usually several months from the date of the order),
and the appeal then recedes to the back of my mind until a few weeks
before the argument is held. Then, about two weeks or so in advance,
my administrative assistant emails me PDF versions of the briefs filed
in the cases set for oral argument, and shortly thereafter I download
those briefs to my iPad. I then do a "quick read" of the briefs to
estimate the amount of time I need to set aside to adequately prepare for
the argument, which on average is about one and one-half to three hours
per case (depending on the complexity of the case). And because the
authoring judges are assigned prior to the cases being argued, I spend
additional time on any cases assigned to me, knowing that in just a few
months I will prepare drafts of those opinions for the panel's consideration.
If I have more than three cases scheduled for oral argument (usually
no more than six), my general practice is to spend the entire day before
oral argument reading the briefs and relevant authorities, identifying
any key issues of concern in each case, and drafting questions for the
attorneys at oral argument. On the other hand, if I only have three or
fewer cases, then a half-day before oral argument often allows enough
time to adequately prepare for the cases being argued. Either way, I do
a mini-review of the oral-argument cases the morning of the arguments.
I do not want any distractions during this review or before oral

43, According to court folklore, one practitioner's request for oral argument was based
entirely on the fact that the copy of the plat at issue in the appeal was impossible to
understand unless viewed as a large exhibit and that oral argument was necessary to walk
the court through the details of the plat. A quick glance of the record confirmed the truth
of this assertion, and the request for oral argument was granted.
44. ALSTON & ERD, LLP, supra note 8, at 118 ("The request for oral argument should
be self-contained, and counsel should not assume that the appellate brief will be considered
in ruling on the request.").
45. Id. at 119 ("The Court of Appeals has indicated the request will be granted if any
of the three judges on the panel to which the case is assigned believes oral argument is
warranted.").
46. It should be noted, however, that as a matter of courtesy, a judge who wishes to
grant oral argument in a case that he or she is not assigned to author typically confers
with the assigned judge before granting oral argument in that case.
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argument. Indeed, to the greatest extent possible, I try to be entirely
focused on the issues presented by the appeals and the questions that I
am interested in discussing with the parties' counsel at oral argument.
And that's exactly what a productive oral argument should be: a
discussion. Counsel should reserve the emotion and theatrics for juries.
Appellate judges are neither swayed by nor pleased with such tactics."
We are there, primarily, to (1) determine whether the trial court
committed a reversible legal error (namely, to ensure fair proceedings
and uphold the right to a fair trial)," and (2) ensure that the law is
consistently followed and fairly applied in each case. It is not the role
of an appellate court to "micromanage the manner in which a trial court
conducts its proceedings."'4 9 As such, attorneys who spend precious
oral-argument time attempting to make an emotional appeal to us, or
suggesting that we act as a de novo appellate fact-finder, waste a
valuable opportunity to converse with the judges about the merits of
their client's case."o
Instead, you should be prepared to speak at length with the judges
about your and opposing counsel's strongest arguments. Do not prepare
a speech ahead of time or read from your brief to the court, and you
should fully expect to receive questions from the bench (especially if I am
on the panel). A good oral advocate directly answers the judges'
questions, concedes arguments that are not outcome determinative (and
should be conceded), and knows when to conclude the argument and sit
down. And most importantly, an effective appellate practitioner presents
his client's arguments in an honest and forthright manner, scrupulously
describing the relevant facts and legal authorities to the court."
But does oral argument really matter? Yes, I think it matters greatly
at the court of appeals because it can actually have an impact on the

47. See, e.g., ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, supra note 8, at 219 ("The rule of law is about
independent judges applying the law to the facts without passion or prejudice. So if you
try to be dramatic or appeal to emotion, for example by focusing on the horrible facts of a
case and ignoring the applicable law, it may backfire, because you are implicitly telling the
judge that passion rather than law should dictate the result.").
48. Id. at 35 ("Georgia's appellate courts do not sit as fact-finding bodies and generally
review appeals for correction of errors of law.").
49. Whorton v. State, 321 Ga. App. 335 n.24, 340, 741 S.E.2d 653, 658 n.24 (2013).
50. CT. APPEALS R. 28(d) provides, inter alia, that "[alrgument is limited to [thirty]
minutes for each case," and that each side will be given [fifteen] minutes to argue, "unless
by special leave an enlargement of time is granted."
51. For additional advice on presenting an effective oral argument in Georgia's
appellate courts, see generally ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, supra note 8, at 217-24; TERRY, supra
note 3, at 205-11.
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outcome of the case." To be sure, in many cases, I already have an
idea of how the appeal will ultimately be resolved; but in some cases,
oral argument causes me to seriously rethink matters. And even when
I do not change my mind as to the ultimate judgment line, frequently
oral argument will impact the content, reasoning, or scope of the
resulting opinion. I almost always learn something new and interesting
about the case from the parties' counsel during oral argument. This is
because, unlike the federal judiciary, the amount of time spent by the
judges and their staff preparing for oral argument is severely constrained by the court's heavy caseload and the two-term rule, as
discussed supra.
Indeed, when I clerked for Judge Daniel A. Manion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, our chambers spent a
considerable amount of time on each case prior to oral argument. In
addition to Judge Manion's extensive preparations, I would also read the
briefs, exhaustively research the relevant issues, examine the entire
record, and write a detailed bench memo for each case. Then, the day
before oral argument, Judge Manion and I would spend anywhere from
five to six hours discussing, among other things, the issues presented by
those cases. As such, by the time oral argument occurred, Judge Manion
was already prepared to begin drafting an opinion for each case."
In stark contrast, as a judge on the Georgia Court of Appeals, I do
almost all of the preparation for oral argument by myself. I do not have
the benefit of much (if any) input from my staff attorneys because they
are constantly assisting me with draft opinions for the current term and
working diligently on my behalf to ensure that the court meets its
constitutional deadline for these cases. Thus, while I always strive to be
well prepared for oral argument, the reality is that only so much can be
done in advance given the current time constraints placed upon the
court. And what this means for you, the advocate, is that oral argument
is of much greater importance at the court of appeals than in any federal
court in which you will ever practice. Indeed, if you are intimately
familiar with the record and relevant authorities, you will be in a unique
position to educate the court about your case before the judges on the

52. For this reason, lawyers should not take too much comfort in (or walk away
despondent because of) the questions posed by the judges at oral argument. Until the
judges have had an opportunity to fully immerse themselves in the case, it is simply
premature to conclude that the case has either been won or lost.
53. Because I believe very strongly in the absolute confidentiality of the judge-law clerk
relationship, I received permission from Judge Manion to disclose, in very general terms,
the preparations that he and his law clerks go through in preparing for oral argument, as
well as the term his clerks use for spading, i.e., "clerkulation". See also infra note 59.
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panel have made up their minds. So, yes, Virginia, oral argument
matters greatly at the court of appeals.
And there are other reasons, entirely unrelated to the merits of an
appeal, why holding oral argument on a regular basis is important. For
example, the practice of holding oral argument by an appellate court
furthers the worthy goal of professionalism in the practice of law. It is
absolutely essential for Georgia lawyers to understand how to present
a compelling and effective appellate argument, and this simply cannot
happen if the court of appeals, which handles approximately eighty-five
percent of all appeals in Georgia,' does not hold oral argument on a
regular basis. Thankfully, Georgia is blessed to have many outstanding
appellate practitioners, and I am grateful for the amount of time and
effort these lawyers expend in their preparations for oral argument. As
Justice David Nahmias of the Georgia Supreme Court has aptly noted,
"good oral advocacy improves the quality of Georgia's appellate courts
and the decisions that they issue.""
Finally, oral argument is a vital aspect of the court's transparency to
the people we serve. At least three to four times per month, ten months
per year, any citizen can attend our oral arguments and witness their
judges in action. And our supreme court now broadcasts live streams of
its oral arguments over the Internet and maintains archives of those
arguments on its website-a practice I hope the court of appeals will
emulate in the very near future. It is absolutely crucial for Georgia's
appellate courts to do everything in their power to educate citizens about
the manner in which they operate and the important role that the
appellate courts have in the state's tripartite system of government.
And by holding oral argument on a regular basis, Georgia's appellate
courts play an integral role in educating the public in this regard, as
well as providing a significant degree of transparency when it comes to
the judiciary's operations.
IV. OPINION WRITING
A month or so after oral argument, the most important part of the
appellate process begins: the drafting of the appellate opinion. And it is
this aspect of my job that garners the greatest interest from lawyers at
seminars and bar-related functions. "Do you write your own opinions?"
"What tasks do your staff attorneys perform to assist you in drafting
opinions?" "Do you conference with the other judges on the panel about

54. SMITH, supra note 3, at 3 ("[R]oughly 85% of Georgia's appellate business is handled
by the Court of Appeals.").
55. ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, supra note 8, at 217.
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your opinions?" These are just a few of the questions lawyers ask about
the opinion-writing process, and I hope this essay will offer some degree
of insight as to how at least one appellate judge approaches the task of
drafting opinions.
So, do I write my own opinions? Yes, I do. To be sure, I have a
tremendous amount of assistance in drafting these opinions. Indeed, it
would be virtually impossible for me to publish approximately sixty-eight
opinions per year-which has been my publication rate since joining the
court---without any assistance and to have those opinions be of any use
to the bench and bar. Thankfully, I have three extremely talented and
dedicated staff attorneys who are intimately involved in the opinionwriting process. This process, of course, varies from chambers to
chambers, and I am in no way suggesting that my method of opinion
writing is superior to that of my colleagues. What follows, then, is
simply the process that works best for my chambers.
But at the outset, it is helpful to first understand how cases are
assigned to each judge. First, the clerk's office randomly assigns a
proportional share of the court's cases for each term to the judges via a
computer-generated system, or "wheel."" After those assignments are
made, every judge's chambers receives a "yellow sheet" for each case that
identifies the parties, the attorneys involved in the appeal, and the trial
judge who handled the case below. In my chambers, upon receiving
these documents, my administrative assistant immediately and
randomly assigns a staff attorney to assist me with these cases in a
proportional manner (after any necessary recusals are made). She does
this by creating "term sheets" for each staff attorney, which list the
assigned case numbers, style of the cases, and status of the cases (that
is, not drafted, drafted, circulating, dismissed, withdrawn, transferred,
and clerk/publication). And while my assistant is busy making the
foregoing arrangements for the upcoming term, the court's central-staff
attorneys are skillfully examining each and every appeal and application
to determine whether the jurisdictional requirements have been
satisfied." If so, then a purple check mark is placed on the first

56. Id. at 147 ("Cases are assigned to the judges of the Court of Appeals through the
use of four 'wheels,' one each for: (i) direct appeals for criminal cases; (ii) direct appeals for
civil cases; (iii) interlocutory applications; and (iv) discretionary applications. The clerk
uses the wheels to assign cases as they are docketed to the four divisions of the court. The
first four cases are assigned to the presiding judges, the next four cases are assigned to the
second-most senior judges on each panel, and the next cases are assigned to the least
senior judges on each panel. The cycle then repeats itself.").
57. In addition to conducting an initial jurisdictional review of every appeal and
application docketed with the court, our central-staff attorneys also assist the judges in
reviewing the merits of discretionary and interlocutory applications and occasionally serve
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volume of the record to indicate to the judges that the case has passed
the initial jurisdictional review." If not, then the case is dismissed by
the court on jurisdictional grounds.
Each term begins with my administrative assistant retrieving the
original briefs and records for all of my cases from the clerk's office and
then delivering those documents to the staff attorneys assigned to assist
me with those cases. My staff attorneys are then charged with drafting
memoranda that summarize the cases assigned to my chambers. This
allows me to identify cases that may be more complex in nature and to
formulate a game plan for the best way to approach drafting the
opinions. In some cases, I may draft the opinion without any initial
assistance from the assigned staff attorney. And in other cases (indeed
in the majority of cases), I direct the assigned staff attorney to prepare
an initial draft of the proposed opinion, which then serves as a starting
point or template for my own drafting and review process. But
regardless of the manner in which the initial draft opinion is prepared,
I personally work through numerous drafts of any opinion before it ever
circulates to my colleagues for their consideration.
In preparing an initial rough draft of an opinion, my staff attorney or
I will, without exception, perform the following tasks: (1) thoroughly
examine the appellate record, (2) carefully and repeatedly read the
parties' briefs, (3) copiously outline the parties' arguments, (4) exhaustively research the relevant issues, and (5) extensively cite the relevant
parts of the record and applicable legal authorities. This initial draft
opinion then goes through a rigorous vetting process that we refer to
internally as "spading,"9 which, in a nutshell, involves the other two
staff attorneys mirroring the aforementioned tasks-that is, thoroughly
examining the appellate record, carefully reading the parties' briefs,
extensively researching the relevant issues, Bluebooking, and the like.
This process also often involves extended discussion with my staff

as "floating" staff attorneys to the judges (i.e., they temporarily work "in chambers" when
one of the judge's staff attorneys is sick or is taking an extended leave).
58. Each judge conducts a separate and distinct jurisdictional review of each appeal
and application, and, on occasion, this review results in the dismissal of the case.
59. The origin of "spading" at the court of appeals is a bit of a mystery, but it is a fairly
common term that derives from the idea of "digging" into a case. See Darby Dickerson,
Citation Frustration&-andSolutions, 30 STETSoN L. REV. 477, 478 (2000) (referring to
"spading" as the "process through which law review members check the substantive
accuracy of articles, place citations in the proper form, ensure that cited sources are still
good law, and correct grammatical and typographical errors"). At the Seventh Circuit, we
referred to this process as "clerkulation," but, regardless of the terminology, it is typical
for there to be an in-depth analysis of every case handled in chambers prior to giving that
case to the judge for his or her consideration.
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attorneys both before and after a draft opinion is produced. Indeed, it
is not at all unusual for me to conference with all three of my staff
attorneys in particularly difficult cases. This does not happen every day
or even every week because many of our cases are fairly straightforward;
but, when the issues presented in an appeal are novel or especially
complex, I do not hesitate to collaborate with my entire staff.6 0
Throughout the drafting and review process, there are core principles
of my judicial philosophy that my staff attorneys employ when providing
assistance in each and every case when those principles are applicable.
They are aware, in no uncertain terms, that I am an originalist and a
textualist with an abiding commitment to (1) adhere to the plain or
original meaning of the statutory and constitutional provisions that I am
charged with interpreting;6 ' (2) faithfully follow and apply the precedents of the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, and
the United States Supreme Court; (3) clarify and stabilize, to the
greatest extent possible, the court of appeals case law;" and (4) honor
the separation-of-powers doctrine by respecting the strict demarcation
line between judicial interpretation and legislative policy making.' My
staff attorneys, then, are guided by these core principles in each opinion
with which they assist me in drafting, and these principles are clearly
reflected in the opinions I author.
After an initial draft opinion is completed, I go through several levels
of review before circulating that final opinion to the other judges on the
panel (in order of seniority) for their consideration. Initially, my
primary focus is to reconsider whether the judgment line is correct. And

60. I also do not hesitate to consult with my colleagues or their staff attorneys if they
have previously dealt with or have specialized knowledge in certain areas of law, or if I
want a perspective from someone outside of my own chambers. It sounds trite, but there
really is a familial-like collegiality at the court of appeals. And while the court's judges
may operate as "twelve sovereigns," we all have the same goal-to get it right.
61. State v. Able, 321 Ga. App. 632, 636, 742 S.E.2d 149, 152 (2013) (Dillard, J.) ("A
judge is charged with interpreting the law in accordance with the original and/or plain
meaning of the text at issue (and all that the text fairly implies), as well as with faithfully
following the precedents established by higher courts.").
62. See id.; State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352, 707 S.E.2d 560, 566 (2011) ("[The
doctrine of stare decisis prohibits this Court from ignoring the valid precedent of a higher
court.").
63. See, e.g., Nelson, 307 Ga. App. at 225-26, 704 S.E.2d at 873-74 (Dillard, J.)
(clarifying language in prior opinion and reconciling that decision with other opinions).
64. See, e.g., Able, 321 Ga. App. at 636, 742 S.E.2d at 152 ("Suffice it to say, it is not
the role of a judge to 'interpret' constitutional or statutory provisions through the prism
of his or her own personal policy preferences."); see also Colon v. Fulton Cnty., 294 Ga. 93,
97, 751 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted) (noting that "under our
system of separation of powers this Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes").
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in all but a small percentage of the cases, I come away from this reading
of the opinion with the same view I held after my initial examination of
the case. This is because, as noted supra, any particularly difficult cases
are thoroughly discussed in my chambers and vetted long before I begin
my final examination of the draft opinion.
If, for some reason, I do have any lingering questions about the
judgment line, I will confer with my staff attorneys to discuss these
concerns. This conversation almost always results in my delving even
deeper into the research conducted thus far, or in directing a staff
attorney to conduct additional research to determine whether my
concerns are valid. In rare instances, these discussions and additional
work result in a revised judgment line. But in most cases, I conclude
that the proposed judgment line is correct, and my attention then turns
to the readability, structure, and reasoning of the draft opinion.
My goal is to issue opinions that any person of reasonable intelligence
(with no legal background) can understand. I firmly believe that the law
should be accessible to the people, not just to a small group of specialists
who "speak the language."
That said, I am well aware that my
opinions are primarily read by judges and lawyers, and therefore need
to be written in a way that provides the bench and bar with as much
clarity and stability in our jurisprudence as possible. Thankfully, there
are very few cases in which the readability of an opinion must suffer to
clearly and precisely analyze the legal issues presented by the appeal.
In addition to the time dedicated to addressing readability and clarity
concerns, I also spend a great deal of time immersed in the relevant and
applicable case, statutory, and constitutional law cited by the parties in
their briefs and those citations included in the draft opinion. It is
imperative that I fully understand the legal landscape at issue in the
appeal before I can have complete confidence that the reasoning
contained in the draft opinion, and for that matter the proposed
judgment line, is correct. And to do that, I frequently spend a considerable amount of time analyzing the relevant statutory frameworks (far
beyond the specific subsections being relied upon by the parties), reexamining our state and federal constitutions, and tracing jurisprudential lines back to their origin.
My approach to opinion writing is a bit organic. At the risk of
sounding like a child of the 1960s, I try to get the "feel" of a case before
delving into the merits. This means that in some cases I may follow a

65. One of the methods I use to ensure that my opinions "sound" more conversational
in nature is to read them aloud. I find that doing this helps me to remove the more formal
or stilted language in a draft opinion, as well as identifying areas of the opinion in need
of better transition sentences.
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more traditional method of review by reading the trial court's order, the
parties' briefs in the order they were filed, any relevant record excerpts,
and the accompanying case law and statutes, and in other cases I may
start the process by reading the appellant's reply brief It all depends
on the particulars or nature of the case before me. I believe there is
great value in "mixing things up," as it were, and that using the same
analytical approach in every case runs the risk of squelching creative
and outside-the-box thinking.
One important decision to be made for each case is whether the
opinion will be designated for publication. Indeed, I almost always have
a discussion with a staff attorney about the pros and cons of publishing
the opinion in question. And the overarching question I ask before
recommending that any opinion be published is whether it clarifies,
changes, or adds to, in any respect, the existing body of case law. This
is because whenever an opinion is published there is always a danger
that it will make the law less clear. And for this reason, among others,
I strongly believe that appellate judges should be very deliberate and
cautious before deciding to publish an opinion.
At the end of the day, each opinion bears my name as author for time
immemorial, and, accordingly, I take my duty to provide clarity and
stability in our case law very seriously. This is also why I am selective
in the opinions I choose to publish.66 And while I understand that
some of my colleagues believe that publishing the overwhelming majority
of the court's opinions ensures the greatest amount of transparency, I
am convinced that the manner in which the court currently operates-with a considerable case load and the two-term rule-makes it
virtually impossible to do so while maintaining a desirable level of
quality control. And thus, in my view, the court of appeals publishes far
too many cases.67
Thankfully, the court of appeals has a means for disposing of more
routine appeals without the need to draft a published or unpublished
opinion. Court of Appeals Rule 3661 provides for an "affirmance
without opinion" in cases in which:

66. An unpublished or "unreported" opinion is "neither a physical nor binding precedent
but establishes the law of the case as provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(h) [(2006)]." CT.
APPEALS R. 33(b); see also CT. APPEALS R. 34 ("Opinions are reported except as otherwise
designated by the Court. The official reports shall list the cases in which opinions were
written but not officially reported and shall indicate the authors and participants in the
opinions.").
67. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRrING 7 (3d ed. 2012) ("No one, not even the
most fervent supporter of publication in every case, can seriously suggest that every one
of these cases ... has precedential or institutional value.").
68. CT. APPEALS R. 36.
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1. The evidence supports the judgment;
2. No reversible error of law appears and an opinion would have no
precedential value;
3. The judgment of the court below adequately explains the decision;
and/or
4. The issues are controlled adversely to the appellant for the
reasons and authority given in the appellee's brief."
Rule 36 cases "have no precedential value," and typically involve a onepage order relying on one or more of the criteria noted above.o
In Rule 36 cases, I speak with a staff attorney at the outset of the
review, and before any written work is done, about disposing of the
appeal in this manner. And if I decide that a Rule 36 "opinion" is
appropriate, the staff attorney will then prepare two documents for
my-and, ultimately, the other panel members'-consideration: (1) a
memorandum explaining why the case is one in which a written opinion
is unnecessary and how the designated Rule 36 criteria have been
satisfied,n and (2) a one-page order outlining the grounds for disposing
of the case by way of Rule 36.
After the foregoing documents are prepared, I then read the memorandum, proposed order, and parties' briefs to ensure that I still agree with
this method of handling the case. If so, I reread the proposed memorandum to determine if any revisions are necessary, and I carefully examine
the controlling legal authorities. I do not, however, spend significant
time worrying about whether the memorandum conveys my "voice" or
whether certain passages are particularly eloquent. It is, after all, an
internal memorandum that the parties will never see. To put it plainly,
a Rule 36 memorandum needs to be substantively accurate, not
Shakespearean verse.
With all of that said, parties receiving a Rule 36 opinion should
understand that there has, nevertheless, been a great deal of work and
consideration by the judges and staff attorneys leading up to that order.
And while I certainly understand the frustration many lawyers feel

69. Id.
70. See id.
71. This does not mean that a case disposed of by way of Rule 36 never results in a
published opinion. See, e.g., City of St. Marys v. Brinko, 324 Ga. App. 417, 422, 750 S.E.2d
726, 729 (2013) (affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants
on certain tort claims in a consolidated appeal pursuant to CT. APPEALS R. 36); Lexington
Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 323 Ga. App. 191, 746 S.E.2d 924 (2013) (a published Rule 36 opinion
with a dissenting opinion); Jones v. Forest Lake Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, 312 Ga. App. 775,
720 S.E.2d 174 (2011) (a published Rule 36 opinion sanctioning the appellant for bringing
a frivolous appeal).
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when they receive a one-page order, rather than a written opinion, the
unfortunate reality is that Rule 36 is a crucial time-management tool for
judges in addressing the court of appeals considerable caseload" and
the always-looming deadlines imposed by the two-term rule.
V. CONCURRENCES AND DISSENTS

In addition to the approximately 150 opinions I am assigned to author
or dispose of every year, I am also required to carefully examine and
consider the merits of approximately 300 opinions or orders drafted by
my colleagues on the panel, as well as those that "roll over" to my
division as a result of a dissent or are considered en banc. To be sure,
most of the opinions issued by our court are not particularly controversial and result in unanimous decisions with full concurrences from the
other judges." But occasionally, we do disagree with one another. And
when that happens, a judge who takes issue with the proposed opinion
has numerous options.
If a judge agrees with the judgment line in a proposed opinion, but not
all of the reasoning contained therein, he or she can (1) draft a
memorandum to the authoring judge outlining the problems or concerns
with the opinion, and identifying any language that needs to be added
or omitted in order to obtain the full concurrence of that judge;" (2)
draft a special concurrence that includes a full concurrence, but which
provides additional reasoning for or commentary concerning the court's
decision; (3) draft a special concurrence that does not include a full
concurrence (thus making the opinion or any disputed division of the
opinion of no precedential value), but outlines entirely separate
reasoning for concurring in the judgment line; (4) draft a concurrence
dubitante, which is a full concurrence, but one that is done so doubtfully;
or (5) simply concur in judgment only with or without a separate
opinion, which also renders the opinion of no precedential value." If

72. See ALDISERT, supra note 67, at 4 ("As courts have gotten busier . .. the pace of
opinion publishing has not been able to keep up with the rate of incoming cases.").
73. ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, supra note 8, at 142-43 ("The Court of Appeals is divided into
'rotating' three-judge 'panels' or 'divisions.' These three-judge panels ordinarily render the
decisions of the Court of Appeals . . . The Court of Appeals decides cases with panels of
more than three judges only in limited circumstances.").
74. Occasionally, a judge will simply pen a brief handwritten note to the authoring
judge, outlining any areas of concern. These notes are treated no differently than a more
formal memorandum and they are circulated along with the file for the other judge or
judges' consideration.
75. There is even one extraordinary occasion in which I published an opinion
"concurring dubitante in judgment only," which means that I had serious doubts in that
case about not only the reasoning of the majority opinion but also the judgment line. See
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a judge on the original panel joins the special concurrence of another
judge, the case is then reassigned to the author of the special concurrence and that concurrence becomes the majority opinion.
If a judge disagrees with the judgment line, he or she may author a
dissenting opinion, which will then cause the case to transition to a
seven-judge "whole court," consisting of the original panel members, a
backup panel of judges, and the presiding judge of the next division.7 6
For example, if a judge on the First Division dissents from an opinion
authored by one of the other panel members, the case will then be voted
on by all three judges of the First Division, all three judges of the Second
Division, and the presiding judge of the Third Division." A majority
opinion or dissent will only trigger the consideration of the entire
(twelve-judge) court when it seeks to overrule a prior precedent, or when
the majority of the original panel of judges or those of a seven-judge
"whole court" conclude that the case is of such importance that it
warrants en banc consideration (something that rarely happens)." If

Nalley v. Langdale, 319 Ga. App. 354, 372-73, 734 S.E.2d 908, 922 (2012) (Dillard, J.,
concurring dubitante in judgment only). This type of concurrence has only been used once
in the history of the court of appeals and is affectionately referred to by one of my
colleagues as "concurring Dillardtante." See Alyson M. Palmer, Judges, Lawyers Mull
Possible Changes to State Appeals Court, FULTON COuNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 13, 2014
("Dillard said in his concurrence that the two-term rule precluded him 'from engaging in
the type of extended study necessary to achieve a high degree of confidence that my
experienced, able colleagues are right.' McFadden quipped that it was a 'concurrence
Dillardtante,' adding, 'if he didn't pull an all-nighter before he did that, it was pretty darn
close.").
76. See O.C.GA. § 15-3-1(c)(1) ("Each division shall hear and determine, independently
of the others, the cases assigned to it, except that the division next in line in rotation and
a seventh Judge shall participate in the determination of each case in which there is a
dissent in the division to which the case was originally assigned.").
77. The chief judge of the court of appeals, currently the Honorable Herbert E. Phipps,
appoints the presiding judges and assigns the remaining judges to serve on one of the
court's four divisions. See O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(b) ("The court shall sit in divisions composed
of three Judges in each division. Two Judges shall constitute a quorum of a division. The
assignment of Judges to each division shall be made by the Chief Judge, and the personnel
of the divisions shall from time to time be changed in accordance with rules prescribed by
the court. The Chief Judge shall designate the Presiding Judges of the divisions and shall,
under rules prescribed by the court, distribute the cases among the divisions in such
manner as to equalize their work as far as practicable.").
78. See O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(c)(2) ("In all cases which involve one or more questions which,
in the opinion of the majority of the Judges of the division or of the two divisions plus a
seventh Judge to which a case is assigned, should be passed upon by all the members of
the court, the questions may be presented to all the members of the court; and if a majority
of all the members of the court decide that the question or questions involved should, in
their judgment and discretion, be decided by all the members of the court, the case shall
be passed upon by all the members of the court, provided that a majority of the Judges
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the court sitting en banc considers a case and is "evenly divided" at sixsix, the case is then transferred to the Georgia Supreme Court (without
the opinion being published)."
Unlike the majority opinions I author, I typically draft concurrences
and dissents with very little assistance from my staff attorneys. To be
sure, I have asked my staff attorneys for their assistance in drafting
concurrences and dissents on occasion, and I always confer with one or
more of them before any opinion leaves my chambers, but I generally do
not confer with my staff attorneys about other judges' opinions. My
intent is to handle. as much of the "other judge" work as possible, which
allows my staff attorneys to primarily focus on assisting me with the
opinions I author.
With all of that said, practitioners should understand that even when
the court issues a unanimous decision, the other judges on the panel are
always fully engaged in the opinion-writing process. Indeed, there is
often a great deal of informal conferencing, exchanging of back-and-forth
memoranda, and substantial revisions to the proposed opinion, all of
which the parties never see. There are even cases in which the proposed
opinion triggers a dissent, is circulated as a seven or twelve-judge
decision, and then, after numerous concurrences and dissents are
drafted, returns to the original three-judge panel and is issued as a
unanimous decision. Those who regularly practice before our court
should not assume that the only time the other panel members are fully
engaged in another judge's case (that is, one they are not assigned to
author) is when they publish either a concurrence or dissent. I spend a
considerable amount of time each term working on opinions authored by
my colleagues, and they do likewise.
VI.

INTERLOCUTORY AND DISCRETIONARY APPLICATIONS

As with direct appeals, an application for a discretionary or interlocutory appeal is randomly assigned to a judge by the court's computergenerated "wheel." The application is then immediately and randomly
assigned to an attorney in central staff to carefully review the application and accompanying materials, conduct any additional and necessary
research (time permitting), and draft a memorandum on behalf of the
assigned judge recommending the grant or denial of the application. All
of this work must be done within a very condensed period of time.

passing upon the case concur in the judgment.").
79. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 5; see also GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 4
(authorizing the court of appeals to certify questions to the Georgia Supreme Court to aid
its decisional process).
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Indeed, O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(f)8o provides that our court must either grant
or deny an application for discretionary appeal within thirty days,8 '
and O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) 2 requires that we must either grant or deny
an application for interlocutory appeal within 45 days." Suffice it to
say, this does not give the central-staff attorneys or judges a significant
amount of time to consider the merits of these applications.
A lawyer hoping to have a discretionary or interlocutory application
granted, then, needs to understand just how important it is to present
a concise and self-contained application to the court. Indeed, regardless
of whether you are filing a discretionary or interlocutory application,
there are steps you can take to increase your client's chances of receiving
the highly sought-after "grant" from our court.
First and foremost, you need to make sure that your application is
narrowly tailored to meet the criteria established by our court in its
rules. Court of Appeals Rule 30(a)" provides that an application for an
interlocutory appeal will be granted only when it appears from the
documents submitted that:
1. The issue to be decided appears to be dispositive of the case; or
2. The order appears erroneous and will probably cause a substantial
error at trial or will adversely affect the rights of the appealing party
until entry of final judgment in which case the appeal will be expedited; or
3. The establishment of precedent is desirable.'
Put another way, is there some compelling reason to stop the
proceedings below and have the court of appeals intervene? It is not
enough to demonstrate that the trial court erred. An application for
interlocutory appeal must show that the trial court erred and that there
will be unjust consequences resulting from that error unless the court of
appeals immediately steps in and corrects it, or, conversely, that judicialeconomy concerns warrant granting the application."
Court of Appeals Rule 31(a)8 ' provides that an application for
discretionary appeal will be granted only when "[rieversible error
appears to exist"" or "[tihe establishment of a precedent is desir-

80. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(f) (2013).
81. Id.

82. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (2013).
83. Id.
84. CT. APPEALS R. 30(a).
85. Id.

86. See generally O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35.
87.
88.

CT. APPEALS R. 31(a).
CT. APPEALS R. 31(a)(1).
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able."
My colleague, Judge Christopher J. McFadden, takes issue
with the nomenclature of applications for "discretionary" appeal, rightly
noting in his well-regarded treatise that there is "no discretion to deny
an application for 'discretionary review' when reversible error appears
to exist.""o
The other basis for granting an application for discretionary appeal,
which is also a ground for granting an application for interlocutory
appeal, is when the "establishment of precedent is desirable."9 Of
course, what is or is not desirable is entirely in the eye of the beholder.
As such, lawyers seeking to have an application for discretionary or
interlocutory appeal granted need to understand that it will almost
certainly be more difficult to receive a grant on this basis, or, at the very
least, that there will be greater uncertainty as to the prospect of the
application being granted on this ground. Indeed, when I discussed this
aspect of the application process with a central-staff attorney, she
quipped, "It seems a little cruel to grant an application to establish
precedent if you know up front that the outcome is likely to be the
same." To which I responded, "True, but the rule does not say that we
will grant an application to establish precedent only when doing so will
benefit the appealing party." An appellate practitioner should be
careful, then, not to conflate the "establish precedent" prong with the
other, and entirely distinct, prongs of Rules 30(a) and 31(a). It is
important to understand that if your application is granted for purposes
of establishing precedent, it may not ultimately be to your liking.
That said, I am quite sympathetic to applications for discretionary and
interlocutory appeal that declare the need for precedent in a particular
area of the law, while candidly acknowledging that the establishment of
such precedent may very well result in a loss for the attorney's client in
that particular case. The key question I ask when considering applications requesting the establishment of precedent is whether the case is a
good vehicle for addressing the issue. A good practitioner, then, explains

89.

CT. APPEALS R. 31(a)(2).

90. McFADDEN, supra note 3, at 437-38; see also SUP. CT. R. 34 ("An application for
leave to appeal a final judgment in cases subject to appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35 shall
. . "); PHF II Buckhead LLC V.
be granted when ... [reversible error appears to exist..
Dinku, 315 Ga. App. 76, 79, 726 S.E.2d 569, 572 (2012) ("Thus, in reviewing discretionary
applications for appeals, our rules require us to grant the application when the trial court
appears to have committed reversible error. Consequently, when this Court examines a
request for a discretionary appeal, it acts in an error-correcting mode such that a denial
of the application is on the merits, and the order denying the application is res judicata
with respect to the substance of the requested review.").
91.

CT. APPEALS R. 31(aX2).
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not only why the establishment of precedent is desirable, but also why
that case is a suitable vehicle for clarifying the issue.
As previously mentioned, the other key to filing a successful application is to make absolutely sure that the application is self-contained and
includes everything needed for the central-staff attorneys and judges to
examine its merits. In this regard, a lawyer must include all necessary
documents in the application, while also taking care not to clutter the
application with extraneous parts of the trial record. You also need to
be precise with your record citations and make it as easy as possible for
the court to confirm that your assertions about the proceedings below are
accurate. Finally, given the severe time constraints on the court in
evaluating these applications, you should not expect the central-staff
attorneys or judges to spend any considerable amount of time doing
additional research on the issues raised by your application. Indeed,
while my staff attorneys and I conduct extensive research in direct
appeals, we will not-and cannot-exert anywhere near that amount of
effort with regard to discretionary and interlocutory applications. To put
it plainly, your application is going to be treated as a "closed memo" of
sorts. If you cannot make your case within the confines of your
application, you are not likely to receive a grant from our court.92 If
your application is granted, it will, of course, be handled in the same
manner as a direct appeal."
VII.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

The Georgia Court of Appeals is one of the busiest intermediate
appellate courts in the country and faces unique challenges as a result
of its heavy caseload and our state's constitutional two-term requirement. Practitioners who understand these challenges and craft their
briefs, presentations, and applications with these challenges in mind can
more effectively represent their clients and ensure that their arguments
are given the greatest consideration possible.

92. It only takes one judge to grant a discretionary or interlocutory application, and an
application is only denied when all three judges on the assigned panel are in agreement
as to the denial of that application.
93. Every once in a while, an application for discretionary or interlocutory appeal that
is granted is later dismissed on the basis that it was "improvidently granted." This is
referred to internally as a "DIG" ("dismissed as improvidently granted"). And if your case
is DIGed, you should not take it personally. It does not mean that your brief was
unpersuasive or that you offended the court. A dismissal on this ground simply means that
the court, after a thorough review of the briefs and record, has concluded that the
application should have never been granted.
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